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The ongoing war in Yemen, which has already displaced millions of people, 
possesses some typical traits that suggest its inclusion among the deadly 
conflicts known as “civil wars.” This article will review briefly the components 
that characterize these types of conflicts and, after providing a summary of 
recent events, will attempt to identify the aspects that render the conflict in 
Yemen an anomalous civil war. It will be contended that, given the anomalies 
observed, the war in Yemen can also be described as a form of transnational 









Since 1945, twenty-five million people have died in civil combat, while millions 
more have been wounded, displaced or impoverished (Armitage, 2017). Ideas, 
definitions and understandings of civil war have always been volatile and 
contested. What is also controversial is where exactly in history the analysis of 
this type of political violence should begin.  
  
In ancient Greece, there was a sharp distinction between violent conflict 
against external enemies (polemos) and among or within cities (stasis). The 
former was deemed a source of potential glory, while the latter a cause of ruin 
and decline. Polemos constituted a form of international politics, stasis a form of 
calamitous anti-politics (Esposito 2018). But it is with events which occurred in 
ancient Rome that the origin of civil war is commonly identified.  
 
In 87 BC, two main factions fought for power in Rome—the “optimates” 
(patricians) and the “populares” (plebeians)—and the confrontation between 
them ended in a horrendous bloodshed known in history as the civil war of 
Marius and Sulla (Abbott 1902). Scholars mention this conflict as the main 
source for the study of ancient civil war, although they also refer to Caesar’s 
(2006) three books that cover the period between 49 and 48 BC, when the then 
Governor of Gaul described himself as the victim of a conspiracy being hatched in 
Rome. As the terms of his mandate in Gaul expired, Caesar was called back to 
Rome to face charges of corruption. Such charges were pressed by his political 
enemies, including Pompeius, Scipio and Marcus Cicero, with whom Caesar 
initially attempted to reach an accommodation. But the power struggle led to 
military battles that spread to Greece and Egypt, where Pompeius was allegedly 
killed. Lucan (1989), the Roman poet, noted that the wounds inflicted by the 
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hand of fellow-citizens sink deeper, and that civil wars are to politics what 
sickness is to the body—both destroy from within.  
 
When the study of civil war takes ancient Rome as a starting point, it is 
assumed that this type of political violence can occur only if a distinct citizenry 
and political community has been established—in other words, if a civitas has 
been created. In the current time, instead, civil wars seem to proliferate due to 
the absence of a civitas, becoming the most destructive form of organized human 
violence. One could object, however, that the designation, “civil war,” is normally 
applied to unsuccessful rebellions or uprisings that defy established 
governments and states. Indeed, we celebrate some such uprisings as exercises 
of people’s right to determine their political destiny, but we condemn others as 
illegal rebellions that deserve to be suppressed at all costs. By labeling a conflict 
“civil war,” commentators perhaps intend to deny any form of legitimacy to 
violent struggles, but were such struggles to prove successful, they would not be 
termed civil wars at all. Large violent conflicts within national territories may 
start with riots and insurrections, and then take the shape of a civil war, whereby 
citizens support one side or the other.  But if the challenging party triumphs, the 
new appellation becomes “revolution.” As Colley (2017:43) puts it, “[r]evolution 
possesses far more positive connotations than the more grubby and ambivalent 
civil war.” 
 
Wars within states appear to characterize the last sixty years of global 
history—an unprecedented shift in the pattern of violent human conflict for 
centuries.  Armitage (2017:7), for example, notes that while estimates differ,  
“since 1945 there have been 259 conflicts around the world that have risen to 
the level of a war, and the vast majority of those were internal conflicts.” 
Inauspicious predictions indicate that climate change, while drawing countries 
into conflict in pursuit of new resources (inter-state conflict) will also multiply 
and intensify civil wars (intra-state conflict) (Lee 2009).  
 
 Regarded as non-international in character, civil war can be defined as a 
conflict which erupts within a national territory where a faction aims to violently 
replace an established authority or secede from it (Ruggiero 2019). Let us assess 
how the features of the Yemeni conflict lend themselves to this definition. After 
providing a summary of recent events, this article will attempt to identify the 
aspects that render the Yemeni an anomalous civil war. It will be contended that, 
given the anomalies observed, the war in Yemen can also be described as a form 
of transnational crime.   
 
 
Houthis and the Saudi Arabia-led coalition  
 
When the Arab Spring touched Yemen, the Houthi movement managed to force 
its longtime ineffective dictator to resign. The uprising led by this Zaidi Shia 
Muslim minority in 2011 resulted in Ali Abdullah Saleh handing power to his 
deputy, Abdrabbuh Hadi. The new president proved equally ineffective, 
particularly in dealing with attacks by jihadists, corruption and food scarcity. The 
growing institutional instability provided the Houthis with the opportunity to 
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occupy and claim governmental control of their northern heartland in the Saada 
province and neighboring areas. Many other Yemenis, including disillusioned 
Sunnis, supported the new rulers and, between late 2014 and early 2015, the 
Sanaa governorate was conquered. The Houthi movement then tried to spread 
its influence across the whole country, occupying southern areas and forcing Mr. 
Hadi to flee abroad (BBC, 21 March 2019). 
 
Given the Houthis’ perceived ideological proximity to Iranian Shia power, 
traditional and current rival-enemy Saudi Arabia set up a coalition with the 
intent of restoring Hadi’s rule. The coalition included Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, 
Kuwait, Morocco, Qatar, Senegal, Sudan and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). 
Logistical and intelligence support was soon received from the United States 
(US), the United Kingdom (UK) and France. The Houthis, in turn, were supported 
by Iran. 
 
In August 2015, the coalition defeated the Houthis and their allies 
stationed in the southern regions of Yemen, capturing the port city of Aden, 
where a provisional government was established. While Hadi remained in exile, 
Yemenis were denied basic survival goods and security, while the Houthis 
consolidated their occupation of Sanaa and began to fire ballistic missiles across 
the border into Saudi Arabia. Now rudderless, Yemen became fighting ground for 
members of al-Qaeda and their rivals, namely local militants of Islamic State, 
who vied in seizing territories in the south of the country. Restrictions on 
imports imposed by the coalition with a view to preventing the smuggling of 
weapons resulted in a blockade impeding the delivery of food and medicine by 
charitable organizations. According to a report released by Amnesty 
International (2019), more than 3 million people—including 2 million children—
became acutely malnourished, rendering them more vulnerable to disease. An 
estimated 85,000 have died between April 2015 and October 2018, almost 20 
million people lack access to adequate healthcare and nearly 18 million do not 
have enough clean water or access to adequate sanitation. In 2018, some 
500,000 people were suspected of having contracted cholera. The war has 
displaced more than 3.3 million from their homes (Amnesty International 2019).  
 
The involvement of disparate groups guided by their own creed and 
interest generated a chaotic situation, which was compounded by infighting 
among pro-government forces. This happened in November 2017, when clashes 
over the control of Sanaa’s biggest mosque caused dozens of deaths.  
 
To be clear, all parties involved committed violations of international law 
and war crimes. The Saudi Arabia-led coalition supporting the internationally 
recognized Yemeni government continued to bomb civilian infrastructure and 
carried out indiscriminate attacks, killing and injuring civilians. The Houthi 
forces shelled residential areas randomly, while all engaged in illegal detention 
practices, torture and summary executions. Widespread lawlessness led to the 
use of anti-personnel landmines and the recruitment of children as soldiers, in 
violation of international law, while targets included markets, schools and 
funeral gatherings. Women and girls faced all forms of violence and boys as 
young as eight were raped, some in mosques (McCourt 2019). 
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A chronology of events, punctuated by the description of alliances, 
betrayals and detailed information about the actors involved and their 
meandering agendas is available in a number of publications (Hill 2017; 
International Crisis Group 2017; Salisbury 2017; Transfeld 2016; Yadav and 
Lynch 2018). For the purpose of this article, however, it is appropriate to select 
from the information available and focus on the arms markets and transfers that 





Yemen, a small Middle Eastern country with approximately thirty million people, 
one of the poorest Arab countries, is heavily armed, causing the death, prior to 
the conflict, of up to 1,200 people annually. Long before the eruption of the civil 
war, governments showed stark inability to control the arms trade, in part 
because the country was divided into the Yemeni Arab Republic, supported by 
the US and Saudi Arabia, and the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen, backed 
by the former Union of Soviet Social Republics (USSR) (CIA 2016). Weapon 
hoarding was a by-product of the Cold War. Estimates indicate that there are 
approximately fifteen million small arms in Yemen— one weapon for every two 
persons (Keefe 2017). The figure becomes even more staggering when taking 
into account the fact that forty percent of the Yemeni population is under the age 
of fourteen. Moreover, considering that cultural norms do not permit women to 
possess guns, it can be suggested that almost every able-bodied Yemeni man 
above the age of fourteen has access to or possesses multiple small arms (Keefe 
2017; Warburton 2016).   
 
Some of these weapons, which belonged to previous foreign forces 
occupying the country, are still in circulation. The Chinese and Soviet 
governments, for instance, supplied the People’s Democratic Republic, while the 
US armed the Arab Republic. Moreover, between 1996 and 2000, Yemen legally 
imported fifty million dollars of small arms from Argentina, Brazil, the Czech 
Republic, France, Germany, the Philippines, Poland, Portugal, South Africa and 
Spain. More recently, Houthi rebels gained possession of US vehicles and Marine 
Corps weaponry when the US abandoned its embassy in the country (Sisk 2015). 
 
With the start of the conflict and the consequent international ban on 
military exports to Yemen, illicit transactions allowed the flow of arms to 
continue and expand. The techniques commonly in use for illegal transfers of 
arms were and are still used, including the falsification of end users, whereby 
consignments are delivered officially to authorized recipients and then diverted 
to unauthorized customers (Gilby 2009; Ruggiero 2000). Such customers include 
non-state actors (Bastien Olivera 2014).  
 
The illicit trade, in brief, thrives in parallel with the civil war—at the same 
time, its product and its cause. Interviews conducted by Al Yasiri (2014) 
revealed that residents could provide for their family for six months by selling 
one AK-47 rifle. As the war escalated and as living conditions crumbled, civilians 
 5 
began to supplement income by selling arms. Dealers started using social media 
sites to advertise their goods, while in some cases, underpaid military officials 
used their position to acquire small arms legally to then sell them illicitly (Al 
Yasiri 2014).  
 
It could be asserted that civil wars last longer than other violent conflicts 
because those involved feel they will not survive defeat. In Yemen, however, the 
long duration of the civil war can be explained, in part, by the existence of a 
prosperous arms market in which combatants and civilians alike participate. 
When Saudi Arabia was granted the support of the US in starting the 
bombardment of Yemen, diplomats and military personnel assured their 
powerful ally that the campaign would be over within six weeks (Niarchos 
2018). Wittingly or otherwise, they underestimated the driving force of the arms 
illicit market, which, in fact, was destined to enlarge thanks to the involvement of 
western countries.    




Arms sales by western countries to Saudi Arabia were and continue to be 
denounced widely, from investigative journalists to nongovernmental 
organizations to unions. For example, in the French port of Le Havre, unionized 
protesters stopped a consignment of weapons destined for Saudi Arabia; a 
similar protest took place later in the Italian port of Genoa (Al Bawaba, 21 May 
2019). The French investigative website, Disclose, published leaked documents 
that showed Saudi Arabia using French weapons against civilians, including 
tanks and laser-guided missile systems. The 15-page classified report written by 
France’s military intelligence agency and made public by Disclose, included maps 
that provided details of the positioning of French-made weapons inside Yemen 
and on the Saudi side of the border. Faced with growing criticism, French 
President Emmanuel Macron admitted that the weapons were indeed being 
used, but only on the Saudi border and for defensive purposes (Lough and Irish 
2019). The intelligence document, however, stated that Caesar cannons, 
manufactured by French company Newter and deployed along the Saudi-Yemeni 
frontier, conducted “defensive shelling” of Houthi forces while positioned within 
Saudi territory, showing that the Yemen could be well be bombed without 
invading its territory. Satellite images, video and photographs taken by civilians 
revealed some Leclerc tanks bought by the UAE had taken part in coalition 
offensives. Moreover, The Caesar artillery guns have a 42 km range and can 
reach the northern regions of Yemen, as can the Mirage 2000, positioned on the 
border. Some 500,000 Yemenis were said to live within the range of French 
artillery placed on the Saudi-Yemen border (Press TV 2019). Finally, two French-
built ships participated in the blockade of Yemeni ports that led to food and 
medical shortages and the humanitarian crisis referred to above.   
 
France is a signatory of the United Nations (UN) Arms Trade Treaty that 
regulates the international transfer of conventional weapons and bans the sale of 
military equipment that fuel human rights violations or war crimes. Germany, 
too, is a signatory and imposed an embargo on arms exports to Saudi Arabia over 
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the killing of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi, which compounded concerns 
over Riyadh’s role in the Yemen war. The move drew criticism from the arms 
industry and from France and Britain, which saw it as an obstacle to their 
“peaceful project” in the area (Lough and Irish 2019). Weapons, in brief, were 
meant to “arm peace.” 
 
In countries like Britain and France, officials regard arms deliveries to 
Saudi Arabia and its key partner, the UAE, as critically important for keeping 
military influence in the Middle East and, at the same time, for preserving 
thousands of jobs. Saudi Arabia is France’s second-biggest customer in the sector 
after Egypt. The UK, on the other hand, accounts for 23% of arms imports by 
Saudi Arabia and in 2018 the two countries signed a multibillion-pound 
preliminary order for the transfer of 48 Eurofighter Typhoon fighter jets. 
According to figures analyzed by the advocacy group, Campaign Against the 
Arms Trade, the UK has licensed nearly £5 billion in weapons to Saudi Arabia 
since the bombing of Yemen began in 2015 (AFP 2019).  
 
Regarding the role of the US in military procurement in the area, it should 
be recalled that, in November 2015, despite skepticism toward the Saudi war 
plan and evidence of heavy civilian casualties, the Obama Administration agreed 
to a giant weapons sale totaling US$1.29 billion. As Niarchos (2018:3) reports, 
“[b]y the end of Obama’s Presidency, the US had offered more than a hundred 
and fifteen billion dollars worth of arms to Saudi Arabia, the largest amount 
under any President, including warships, air-defense systems and tanks.” But the 
history of large-scale arms sales to Saudi Arabia begins in the late 1960s, when 
American producers and politicians were alarmed by French and Soviet 
competition in arming the Arab-Israeli conflicts (Bronson 2006). Lobbyists 
persuaded the US government that arms sales were crucial for stability of the 
region, the fight against international terrorism, and as a counterbalance to the 
power of Iran. One modality used by the US for weapon transfers consists of 
appointing American experts based in the receiving country and tasking them 
with the assemblage and maintenance of the arms. In this way, at least 
theoretically, they can be dismantled in the event that the side the US wishes to 
support—in this case, the Saudis—shifts its political allegiance. In 2016, the 
maintenance contract for the Royal Saudi Air Force’s two hundred and thirty F-
15 fighter jets alone was worth US$2.5 billion. President Obama, in brief, 
continued the traditional amicable relationship with Saudi Arabia cultivated by 
President Franklin D. Roosevelt (Riedel 2018). 
 
Arming stability, and therefore peace, continued under President Donald 
J. Trump, whose business deals and personal connections with Saudi Arabia 
predate his entrance into office. In 2017, Trump announced a US$110 billion 
arms deal with the Saudi government and, reversing the decision of the Obama 
Administration, precision-guided missiles were included in the package. “Jobs, 
jobs, jobs,” Trump is alleged to have claimed.  When a funeral was attacked in the 
city of Sana’a, killing over a hundred and forty mourners, however, few 
comments were heard about the devastation caused by those “jobs.” The bomb 
used was a Mark-82 produced by Raytheon, the third largest defense company in 
the US and had been modified with a laser guidance system, made in factories in 
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Arizona and Texas (Niarchos 2018). Among the victims many were supporters of 
the official government. 
 
 
International wrongful acts 
 
The European Union (EU) and the UN have attempted repeatedly to regulate the 
transfer of arms. For example, the Group for Research and Information on Peace 
and Security, an independent research center based in Brussels, Belgium, has 
pressed for the creation of a pan-European watchdog to regulate arm brokering 
and to control the trade in ammunition. Some national governments, however, 
have often claimed that regulation is costly and ineffective, while others have 
provided their own interpretation of existing norms and subjectively defined 
what is acceptable in the arms business (GRIP 2009, 2012). The ambiguity of 
regulations offers ample choice, as for example those enunciated in the UN Arms 
Trade Treaty, noted above (UNODA 2014). The UN Arms Trade Treaty does not 
mandate that countries stop exporting weapons to countries at war. It requires 
only that governments carry out assessments that their weapons will not 
contribute to war crimes. Presumably, UK, the US and France have concluded 
that there is no reason to stop their exports, unless evidence can be produced of 
their gross negligence or of the intention to promote war crimes. As Dodman 
(2019:3) puts it, “[i]nternational law says you have to be very careful, but it is 
hard to prove that one hasn’t been careful.” 
 
In 2001, the International Law Commission, established by the UN 
General Assembly in 1948 and tasked with promoting the codification of 
international law, stressed that a state which assists another state in the 
commission of an internationally wrongful act is responsible for having done so.  
But it clarifies that the former must be aware of the purpose and use of the 
assistance given. In other words, complicity between countries providing 
weapons and countries receiving them is a charge that can be leveled only when 
the former have knowledge that what they provide will be used against civilians, 
against humanity, for genocidal purposes and the commissions of other war 
crimes (Aust 2011). 
 
Whether legal or illegal, arms transfers can always fuel atrocities 
(Amnesty International 2017). Research on illicit arms trafficking has identified 
some constant features. First, there are arms manufacturers and financial 
institutions supporting them. The former have permanent contact with officials 
and security services, whose role includes the monitoring of the quality and 
quantity of arms produced. Second, there are mediators and wholesale traders 
and, third, there are politicians who take decisions regarding the transfer of arms 
abroad. They are in charge of ensuring that weapons reach the intended 
customers and that embargoes imposed on certain countries are respected. The 
arms business, therefore, may become illegal in a number of ways. The illegality 
may reside in the quality and quantity of arms produced, which are subject to 
international restrictions and regulations, or may consist of false claims 
regarding the recipient country (UNODA 2014). In this respect, one must recall 
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that the arming of Iraq by British producers took place exactly through such false 
claims (Phythian 1997; Ruggiero 2000).  
 
In Yemen, an Egyptian journalist spent a year tracing and documenting 
the origin of weapons that ended up in the country. He created social media 
accounts using false Yemeni names to get access to the informal trading 
networks and groups. In some cases the sellers were at pains to emphasize that 
the weapons were brand new and had never been fired. Weighty evidence was 
collected that Gulf states have been passing arms sold to their military on to all 
factions at war in Yemen, clearly in breach of “end user” certification laws 
intended to ensure that exported arms are not passed on to third parties 
(Aboelgheit 2018).  
 
In addition, arms destined for rebel groups arrive from Iran, due to the 
inability of government to monitor Yemen’s 1,500-kilometer border. Smuggling 
in Yemen is no longer limited to Yemenis or regional smugglers: non-Arab 
foreigners engage in it too (al-Sayaghi 2014). 
 
The arms trade, however, may become legitimate when incomplete or 
unassembled weapons are transferred and then put together in loco (see the US 
example above). The transfer of dual-use technology that can be appropriate for 
civil as well as military production is also permissible under international law. In 
this way, the country importing the technology will be in a position to produce 
and use arms in its own territory and sell them to third countries. Hence, for 
instance, the proliferation of arms factories in several African countries 
(GunPolicy.org 2019). This process, known as “arms saturation,” is also visible in 
Latin American countries (Ruggiero 2000). 
 
In sum, we are faced with networks of actors and strategies that 
transcend the actual contexts in which civil wars take place. The events 
occurring in Yemen hide dynamics that can be unraveled only by looking 
elsewhere.  The country seems to be the theater of internal conflict but also of 
transnational criminal activity. In order to ascertain this dual character of the 
violence that is devastating Yemen, it may be worth now returning to other 
definitional factors that emerge from the debate on civil wars. 
 
 
A regional war complex    
 
According to a quantitative definition, civil war is “sustained military combat, 
primarily internal, resulting in at least 1000 battle deaths per year” (Armitage 
2017: 217). Econometric studies use a coding rule based on battle deaths 
associated with internal conflicts. Designed to facilitate researchers in the 
creation of a usable dataset for analytical purposes, this quantitative definition 
does not consider the spatial and temporal aspects of large-scale violence. The 
former aspect refers to the participation of numerically large groups of citizens, 
while the latter to the duration of the violent conflict. These two variables give 
rise to a different interpretive model that looks at “regional war complexes” 
rather than civil wars—with the former being characterized by the participation 
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of “foreigners” (Gersovitz and Kriger 2013). The focus, in this case, is on the 
individuals and groups who are neither inhabitants nor citizens of a country 
where large-scale violence is occurring, but may be involved directly in the 
conflict or limit their role to the provision of arms, bases or other forms of 
assistance.  As Gersovitz and Kriger (2013:173) explain, “[a] regional war 
complex has high foreign participation, and domestic participation inside at least 
one of the countries involved in the violent conflict must be high enough to 
challenge the government’s monopoly of force in that country.” 
 
 Adopting this definition, the international aspect of civil wars assumes a 
crucial role. The international element, however, can play a part if external 
forces are invited to support one of the fighting factions or both. In the past, 
ideology tended to shape regional war complexes, such as with the support by 
communist countries for liberation struggles in Africa and elsewhere. Today, by 
contrast, the involvement of “foreigners” may be led by material and geopolitical 
interests that transcend political philosophies, let alone legality. Moreover, civil 
wars can also be caused directly by external forces, as in the cases of Iraq and 
Libya. Detailed studies such as the one produced by Regan (2002) have 
examined the conditions under which the intervention of third parties succeeds 
in stopping civil wars. Successful interventions are said to necessitate consent of 
the fighting parties involved, impartiality on the part of interveners, and the 
existence of a coherent strategy. None of these conditions obtains in Yemen, 
where foreign powers, through involvement in transnational crime, do not stop 
but exacerbate the civil war.  
 
In the current context, then, due to growing human mobility and the 
infinite connections between national states and communities, one could argue 
that all wars are civil wars. Perhaps this is the sense of Foucault’s (2001) 
argument whereby civil war does not indicate the dissolution but the daily 





Western governments have long operated in the Middle East with the aim of 
establishing military alliances there. Economic and political interests have 
guided the development of loyal forces in the area, resulting in a steep increase 
in arms imports. In 2017, seven of the world’s ten highest spenders on military 
equipment were Middle Eastern states (Sipri 2018). Saudi Arabia was the third 
largest spender in the world, having increased its purchases by 74% between 
2008 and 2015, totaling a US$69.4 billion expense in 2017—namely, 10 percent 
of the country’s gross domestic product. The country is involved in regional 
conflicts through the provision of support to rebel groups in Syria and military 
assistance to groups operating in Iran and Qatar. The proxy wars wielded by 
Saudi Arabia has led the country to plan the development of an indigenous arms 
industry which, by 2030, is expected to localize 50 percent of the production of 
military equipment within its territory. The country remains highly dependent 
on arms imports, however, while the national military industry is expected to 
build on imported technology and expertise. 
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The armament of Saudi Arabia increased during the 1990s, when the US 
supplied the country with seventy-two F-15S combat aircrafts, which were 
replaced in 2016 by the improved version known as F-15SA. Cruise missiles with 
a 280-km range (SLAM-ER) were added in the same year, along with a variety of 
guided bombs. The UK supplied Tornado combat aircrafts throughout the 1990s, 
and these were upgraded in the period 2007-2013 and enabled to carry new 
guided weapons, such as Storm Shadow cruise missiles, which have a range of at 
least 250 kilometers. Finally, the main suppliers of arms to Saudi Arabia, for the 
2013-2017 period, were the US (61 percent), the UK (23 percent) and France 
(3.6 percent). 
 
In addition, it should be noted that lack of transparency relating to 
military spending prevents the depiction of the precise quantity and quality of 
the arms imported; moreover, it is unknown to what extent military spending is 
triggered by government officials pursuing personal gain from bribes and other 
types of hidden monetary incentives (Sipri 2018). What is known is that eighty-
two percent of the deaths or injuries resulting from Saudi airstrikes were 
civilians (Amnesty International 2019).  
 
 
Transnational crime  
 
Foucault contended that civil wars constitute a form of daily exercise of power 
rather than a mere destructive clash between groups sharing a specific national 
territory. When applied to the Yemeni situation described so far, this perspective 
needs some modification. In Yemen, power is exercised not only by a national 
state, but also by external forces pursuing geopolitical and material goals. The 
proxy war fought in the country locates the Yemeni conflict in the category of   
“regional war complexes,” characterized by the participation of a variety of 
individual and collective “foreign” actors. Among these are arms producers, 
traders, politicians, external enemies and competitors—all engaged in 
establishing mutually beneficial relationships with internal Yemeni forces. The 
configuration of these relationships and the networks within which they take 
place bear a substantial similarity to those informing transnational crime. It is 
worth identifying some elements within the debate on this type of crime in order 
to ascertain whether they can befit the type of civil war being fought in Yemen. 
 
Transnational crime is associated with the threats posed by illegal cross-
border activities. From a conventional perspective, the focus is on those offenses 
whose inception, prevention and effects involve more than one country, while 
concerns revolve around the feeling of vulnerability that developed countries 
harbor towards externally-originated criminal activity, mainly from developing 
countries. An example of this new version of “alien conspiracy theory” is offered 
by authors who claim that “organized crime in the post-cold-war era presents an 
array of complex and novel challenges to the US security interests” (Lee III 1996: 
6). From a different perspective, transnational crime is founded on alliances 
between diverse actors and entails the production of a mixture of white-collar 
and conventional criminal practices. Dispersed participants and diverse forces 
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are involved in networks in which opportunistic chances are taken and short-
term or long-term joint ventures are set up. In brief, those involved operate in 
developing as well as in developed countries. 
 
This characterization was already clear in 1975, when transnational 
crime appeared on the UN agenda, described as acts performed by a complex 
web of illicit partnerships and alliances between violent groups, corporate actors 
and corrupt politicians. Those involved in what was termed “crime as business” 
included, therefore, individuals endowed with power and high social status who 
misused legitimate techniques of business and industry (UN 1975). Further 
aspects were identified in 1995 and 2000, when among the features of 
transnational crime, the variables mobility, partnership and network were 
foregrounded (UN 1995; 2000). Mobility referred to the increasing opportunities 
to access markets offered to white-collar and conventional criminals, while 
partnership alluded to the joint ventures set up by the two. Finally, the variable, 
network, described consortia involving a range of individuals and groups whose 
different background does not constitute an obstacle to the pursuit of common 
tasks. Transnational networks, it was suggested, are fluid, highly adaptable and 
resilient; they epitomize the intermingling of the local with the global.  
 
The forces operating in Yemen constitute a variant of such transnational 
networks, as they participate in a common enterprise while pursuing their own 
specific task and promoting their own cultural, political and professional 
identity. Houthi rebels and their allies, the Saudi-led coalition, local officials and 
their partners in the western world—all are participants in transnational 
criminal acts. The network in which they operate may be characterized by “weak 
links” in the sense that there is no central organization that coordinates the 
activity of the different components. But perhaps for this very reason, the violent 
acts committed are harder to control both in their typology and intensity. This 
happens when participation is open and, in Yemen, may even be fostered by a 
preexisting gun culture that makes small arms readily available to all. In brief, in 
Yemen, transnational crime as a form of civil war is alimented by networks of 
material and political interest which are relatively open. In this way, every 
component is given the opportunity to create and foster participation by more 
allies and accomplices who are further removed from the war scene. Strong ties 
characterize limited affiliation, whereas the “strength of weak ties” causes a 
widening of the network and produces unpredictable human costs (Granovetter 
1973). 
    
 
Conclusion    
  
The horrors of civil warfare are narrated in holy books and often understood as 
forms of punishment inflicted on disbelievers and sinners. The violent clashes 
that killed over twenty million Chinese in the 1850s and 1860s—the so-called 
Taiping Rebellion, for example—were often interpreted as divine retribution for 
immoral, decadent, or irreligious behavior (Meyer-Fong 2013). Carnages were 
rationalized in these terms, particularly by illiterate people, who would turn to 
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the gods to make sense of their suffering, find the way to moral values, and evade 
divine condemnation.  
 
In order to make sense of their suffering, Yemenis will have, more 
realistically, to question the role played by internal and external forces engaged 
in illegal activity affecting them. As victims of a civil war substantially akin to 
transnational crime, the people of Yemen do not witness a two-sided 
confrontation but are faced with a plethora of diverse actors and motivating 
drives that make the end of conflicts problematic. Hannah Arendt (2016) warned 
that, in post-conflict contexts, institutions allowing individuals and groups to 
participate in collective decision-making should be put in place immediately. 
Without such participatory institutions, conflict will not stop, but will intensify. 
Perhaps this is why the conflict in Yemen seems never-ending, as participation in 
collective decision-making in the country is made particularly hard by the 
multiplicity, diversity and unwillingness of those involved. 
 
Yemen shows that many violent acts carried out during civil wars possess 
an ambiguous nature, as they reveal a political as well as a private motivation. Of 
course, the events taking place in the country testify to the breakdown of 
authority and the emergence of violently competing motivations, manifested 
through random explosions of self-interest. These events echo Thucydides’ 
(2000) classic description of civil wars that drown in ungovernable passions: he 
uses words such as “confusion,” “enmity,” and “revenge”—all connected to a 
process of privatization of violence.  
 
Civil wars may have a “master cleavage,” but often end up exposing local 
or private issues. The Yemeni conflict, while revealing the existence of a master 
cleavage between rebels and the coalition fighting them, brings to the fore illicit 
cross-border practices, business illegality and a process of privatization of 
violence well described in classical texts. A form of transnational crime, the 
conflict demonstrates that civil wars are not merely fought by conflicting groups 
and organizations, but also by a variety of actors pursuing diverse goals. 
Different identities and interests are involved in acts of violence that straddle the 
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